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STEVEN HOLCOMB dba 
STEVE HOLCOMB DISTRIBUTING, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by the plaintiff to collect 
on an account for goods sold; and a counterclaim by the defendant-
appellant for damages resulting from an alleged breach of a 
distributorship contract. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
The trial court prior to trial, granted plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment on its complaint which was unopposed 
by the defendant-appellant. Following a two and one-half day 
trial on the defendant's counterclaim to a jury, the Hon. Bryant H. 
Croft, one of the judges of the Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake county, granted a judgment of directed verdict in 
favor of plaintiff-respondent on defendant-appellant's counter-
claim for breach of a distributorship contract. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-respondent seeks affirmance of the trial 
court's judgment of directed verdict. It appearing that 
defendant-appellant has abandoned his appeal of the Summary 
Judgment granted in the same action, plaintiff-respondent also 
seeks affirmance of that Surrunary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant-appellant (hereinafter "appellant") had 
been delinquent in the payment of his account from the start 
of the verbal contract of distributorship (R. 504 1 514, 516, 
517). Plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter "respondent"), Poly-
glycoat Corporation, was told at the time the distributorship 
agreement (Exhibit D-3) was signed on February 7, 1976, that 
appellant needed the contract so that he could obtain financing 
or money to pay the bills and that was the only reason that 
the distributorship agreement was signed (R. 531) . 
Holcomb paid Polyglycoat only by the case of material 
sent to him. Each case contained twelve maintenance kits with 
warranties and two quarts of the base product. Each case was 
intended to allow twelve new car purchasers to receive cars 
with an application of Polyglycoat base and a maintenance kit 
with warranty (R. 644). 
Experience proved too much base product was supplied. 
Holcomb sold that to dealers for $140 to $150 per quart (R. 642, 
645). He received the sole benefit of these sales (R. 647). 
2 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
As distributor for Polyglycoat, he knew he was supposed 
to use his best efforts to represent the manufacturer (R. 646) . 
Holcomb knew that if Walter Fiveson had known of 
Holcomb's activities in selling excess sealant, printing bogus 
warranties and ordering counterfeit bottles at the time of 
signing the distributorship agreement, Exhibit D-3, he would 
have been upset (R. 670). When Holcomb first heard from Five-
son after Fiveson learned of the duplicity, Fiveson was so 
angry he said he didn't care about the money, he only wanted 
to see Holcomb "up the river" (R. 670). 
At the very time that appellant proposed the written 
contract, he had already devised and undertaken a scheme to 
sell fake products in the containers identical to those ~ 
Polyglycoat and had, in fact, ordered bottles with that t:o~ 
and had ordered counterfeit warranties with the language copied 
from the Polyglycoat Corporation warranties (R. 669) . One case 
of counterfeit warranties and bottles were, in fact, delivered 
to a customer, i.e., Duaine Brown, by appellant's agent and 
employee, Brad Parkinson, about February 18, 1976 (Exhibit 41-P, 
R. 591, 698, 699). Although Holcomb denied authorizing the 
delivery of the bogus products, he admitted picking the shipment 
up from ouaine Brown (R. 698). Appellant, by his own testimony, 
acknowledged that as of February 1, 1976 (six days prior to the 
time the distributor agreement was signed), he had purchased 
3 
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certain materials from Jenson Distributing Company, Salt Lake 
City, consisting of cleaners and various waxes and bottles, to 
experiment with those products to see if, when placed in the 
counterfeit bottles, they would be compatible with the Poly-
glycoat sealant (R. 656). 
The appellant also admitted on cross-examination that 
at the time he was in Las Vegas in February of 1976, on the 
occasion of signing Exhibit D-3, that he had already ordered 
printed warranties counterfeiting those of the respondent, and 
that he had already 
~-~ ~ Polyglycoa~~go on 
Appellant 
ordered sixteen ounce bottles with the 
them (R. 669) . 
had no authority, implied or otherwise, to 
either manufacture the bottles with the Polyglycoat label or to 
print and reprint the warranty or to sell the excess sealant or 
to market the product in any manner inconsistent with the regular 
instructions and method of doing business of Polyglycoat Corp-
oration. The respondent specifically informed appellant that 
the excess product was to be disposed of by giving the dealers 
extra amounts so that they could do their used cars and 
demonstrators. Such was viewed as being a good-will gesture 
(R. 526). The distributors, including appellant, were to be 
given a rebate or some other kind of remuneration for product 
returned to respondent (R. 527) . 
The scheme was called to the attention of Polyglycoat 
4 
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officials in Las Vegas in the latter part of March, 1976, when 
Brad Parkinson, a former employee of appellant, became concerned 
about possible criminal prosecution and recourse against him 
(R. 707, 708, 714, 716, 717). 
Appellant was then terminated as a distributor on 
March 27, when respondent learned of the scheme to pass off 
certain of appellant's product as those of Polyglycoat in counter-
feit bottles and with false printed warranties (R. 537, 538, 
740 and Exhibit 20-D). The termination of the distributorship 
agreement was both verbal and in writing (R. 740, Exhibit 20-D). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN GRANT-
ING PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED 
VERDICT WHERE THERE WAS A SUBSTANTIAL SHOWING 
OF BAD FAITH AND NO MORE THAN A SCINTILLA OF 
EVIDENCE OF GOOD FAITH 
It is inconceivable that a careful reading of the 
record will reveal more than the slightest evidence of good 
faith on the part of the appellant. The trial court was amply 
justified in finding that reasonable men could not differ in 
concluding that fraud and the lack of good faith and the 
presence of substantial bad faith was established by clear-cut, 
unequivocal evidence. The scheme was admittedly motivated by 
profit without the knowledge or consent of respondent and could 
5 
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not, under any stretch of the imagination, be said to be evidence 
of good faith. The undisputed facts indicate a clear intention 
on the part of the appellant not to perform the contract in good 
faith; but on the contrary, to pirate the trademark and warranties 
of Polyglycoat. In addition, the concealment by and failure of 
Holcomb to disclose to respondent the details of the scheme or 
of his intentions at the time Exhibit D-3 was signed, clearly 
constitute a fraud. The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 
Second, Section 473, states: "A contractual promise made with 
the undisclosed intention of not performing it is fraud." 
It is also clear that fraud has been proved under 
Section 471 of the Restatement which defines fraud: '"Fraud' 
as used in the Restatement of this Subject unless accompanied 
by qualifying words means . . (b) concealment or (c) non-
disclosure . . Under the present circumstances, such 
non-disclosure is fraud, without more. See also the Restatement 
of the Law of Contracts, Second, Section 472. The distributor-
ship agreement could not have ripened into an enforceable 
contract because of the active concealment of the appellant of 
the fact that he had in bad faith unfairly engaged in competi-
tion and fraudulently made arrangements to counterfeit 
respondent's bottles and warranties and to palm off his own 
packages as Polyglycoat products. 
Certainly, such non-disclosure could not be privileged 
6 
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under the Uniform Commercial Code. Appellant was held to deal-
ing in good faith, meaning "honesty in fact" and that good 
faith and honesty was imposed as an obligation in every facet 
of the performance and promises under the contract. The Code, 
as it is a part of the law of Utah, states: "Good faith means 
honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned" (U .C.A., 
1953, 70A-l-201(19)). The Code further provides that: "Every 
contract or duty within this act imposes an obligation of good 
faith in its performance or enforcement" (U.C.A., 1953, 70-A-1-
203). The case of Tumber v. Automation Design & Mfg. Corp., 
130 N.J. Super. 5, 324 A.2d 602 (1974) cited at page 6 of appellant's 
brief, points out the increased standards of good faith required 
by merchants under the Code. 
A careful analysis of the cases cited by appellant in 
his brief will reveal that they more fully support the trial 
court's position and that of respondent than that of appellant. 
None of the cases cited by appellant under Point I of his 
argument are directly on point. They involve cases where the 
issue is whether the party is a "buyer in the ordinary course 
of business" or "holder in due course." The case of Walter E. 
Heller & co., Inc. v. Convalescent Home, 49 Ill.App.3d 213, 
265 N.E.2d 1285 (1977), is cited by appellant for the proposition 
that good faith is particularly a jury issue and the defense 
of the lack of good faith cannot be resolved purely as a matter 
7 
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of law. However, the case involved a pleading question and the 
dismissal of an amended answer at the pleading stage on the 
grounds that it raised an insufficient defense as a matter of 
law. The court pointed out that the defense could not be 
resolved as an issue of law "because of . . . evidentiary matters 
relevant to plaintiff's honesty in fact in this particular 
transaction." (265 N.E.2d at 1291) The situation presented in 
that case is clearly different than the situation here where, 
after a full trial of the issues, the trial court directed a 
verdict. Appellant's attempt to persuade this court that a 
directed verdict cannot be entered in such case is untenable. 
The undisclosed sales by Holcomb of quart cans of 
Polyglycoat sealant in competition with respondent, even before 
the execution of the distributorship agreement, constitutes a 
breach of the distributorship agreement under ?OA-2-306(2), 
U.C.A., 1953, which provides: 
* * * 
"(2) A lawful agreement by either the seller or 
the buyer for exclusive dealing in the kind of 
goods concerned imposes, unless otherwise agreed, 
an obligation by the seller to use best efforts 
to supply the goods and by the buyer to use best 
efforts to promote the sale." 
In the instant case there is no substantial contradictor 
evidence on any material point; and the trial court, in directing 
the verdict, did view the evidence most favorably to appellant 
in accordance with the Utah law. The trial court's analysis of 
the good faith issue clearly shows that it considered the 
evidence in accordance with the Utah law and decisions and that 
8 
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reasonable persons could not arrive at any conclusion other 
than there was an absolute lack of good faith on appellant's 
part and overwhelming evidence of his bad faith as shown by the 
uncontroverted evidence and by his own admissions. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF-
RESPONDENT' S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT WHERE 
THERE WAS A FAILURE OF EVIDENCE OF DAMAGE 
Certainly, the trial court would not be required to 
submit the case to the jury on the issue of damages when there 
was an absolute failure of proof of damages. The appetlant's 
own evidence fails to show a loss of profit of any kind. The 
most elementary rules of law provide that damages for breach of 
contract must be proved with reasonable certainty. Wilcox v. 
Regester, 417 Pa. 417, 207 A.2d 817, 842 (1965), states the 
rule as follows: 
There can be no award for breach of contract 
(except in certain cases an award of nominal 
damages) when there is no evidence produced 
by which the jury can measure the damages. 
Damages cannot be awarded by guesswork. The 
Restatement of the Law of contracts, Sec. 
331, lays down the following: "Damages are 
recoverable for losses caused or for profits 
and other gains prevented by the breach only 
to the extent that the evidence affords a 
sufficient basis for estimating their amount 
in money with reasonable certainty." In 
Rice v. Hill, 315 Pa. 166, 172, 172 A. 289, 
291, this Court held: "Damages are never 
presumed; the plaintiff must establish by 
evidence such facts as will furnish a basis 
for their assessment, according to some 
definite and legal rule." 
9 
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POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING PLAINTIFF 
TO AMEND ITS REPLY TO THE COUNTERCLAIM 
The case of Wirtz v. Savannah Bank and Trust Co., 
362 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1966) cited at page 11 of appellant's 
brief, is inapposite. That case dealt, inter alia, with a motion· 
to amend an answer pursuant to Rule 15(b) of Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. This rule allows amendment of pleadings to 
conform to the evidence adduced at trial "/w/hen issues not 
raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent 
of the parties ... " The court found that factually, the 
question involved was not tried "by the express or implied 
consent of the parties." (362 F.2d at 861) In the case at 
bar, the amendment of the pleadings was prior to trial and hence 
the cited case is not controlling. 
Neither should appellant be allowed to claim that 
fraud was not pled with specificity in light of the fact that 
at the time the Motion to Amend Reply was argued to the trial 
court, appellant did not argue that the Amended Reply did not 
plead fraud with specificity, nor was the offer of a continuance 
made by the respondent accepted by appellant. Likewise, 
appellant did not raise this issue in his motion for a new trial 
(R. 155-156). Respondent's Motion to Amend Reply with the 
proposed Amended Reply attached was hand-delivered to counsel 
10 
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for appellant on January 30, 1978 (R. 72), and no mention of lack 
of specificity is made in Defendant's Memorandum in Support of 
its Claims in This Action, presented to the court on February 6, 
1978 (R. 77-92). 
Fraud was pled in appellant's Amended Reply. The 
sufficiency of the pleading was a question to be resolved in 
the considered discretion of the trial court. The cases cited 
by appellant to support his view that the form of the Amended 
Reply was improper are all trial court opinions. On appeal, 
the discretion of the trial court in granting or denying 
amendments to pleadings should not be interfered with absent a 
showing of abuse of that discretion. (See, e.g., Lewis & 
Queen v. S. Edmundson & Sons, 113 C.A.2d 705, 248 P.2d 973 
(1952)) No such abuse of discretion can be shown here. 
Since fraud was pled in the Amended Reply, the case of 
Bunge Corp. v. Recker, 519 F.2d 449 (8th Cir. 1974) is not in 
point. Accepting that lack of faith is akin to fraud, the 
pleading of fraud would, in the case at bar, reasonably cover 
lack of good faith. 
Appellant cannot reasonably be allowed to claim 
surprise and prejudice because respondent was allowed to amend 
its reply to the counterclaim to refer to the "underlying fraud 
and concealment on the part of the Defendant at the time of the 
execution of the contract." This is particularly true in view 
11 
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of the fact that from the outset of this action on April 27, 
1976, the respondent has continuously alleged that appellant 
unlawfully infringed its trademarks and counterfeited Polygly-
coat' s bottles and warranties without authorization and in 
unfair competition. From the outset of this action, appellant 
has been apprised that respondent was claiming its acts to be 
fraudulent and in fact obtained a restraining order and injunc-
tion based upon the appellant's acts constituting infringement 
of the trademark and from using the fake bottles and warranties 
(R. 621) . It is 'O'lear that fraud and deception are the gist 
of such action and the amendments allowed by the court did not, 
in any way, surprise appellant or prejudice him in the defense 
of the action. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court was 
entirely within its judicial province when it granted plaintiff-
respondent' s motion for directed verdict. It is abundantly 
clear from the record that there was an absolute lack of good 
faith on the part of the defendant-appellant. The jury should 
not be allowed to speculate in cases where there is no morw 
than a scintilla of evidence of good faith, and that from the 
defendant-appellant's self-serving declarations. It is submitt~ 
that the evidence is so conclusive on both the issue of good 
12 
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faith and on the issue of damages and there being no showing 
I 
of an abuse of the discretion of the trial court, that the 
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